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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to present a tool-supported approach for visualising personas as social goal
models, which can subsequently be used to identify security tensions.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors devised an approach to partially automate the
construction of social goal models from personas. The authors provide two examples of how this approach
can identify previously hidden implicit vulnerabilities and validate ethical hazards faced by penetration
testers and their safeguards.
Findings – Visualising personas as goal models makes it easier for stakeholders to see implications of their
goals being satisfied or denied and designers to incorporate the creation and analysis of such models into the
broader requirements engineering (RE) tool-chain.
Originality/value – The approach can be used with minimal changes to existing user experience and goal
modelling approaches and security RE tools.
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1. Introduction
Software products and services cannot be secure unless they are usable (Association for
Computer Machinery, 2018), yet too often security and usability are considered as a trade-
off, i.e. you cannot have one without sacrificing the other. In reality, security is a human
value situated in a delicate balance with other values, such as privacy and trust; touching
one value implicates others (Friedman and Hendry, 2019). User research is necessary to elicit
these tensions, but – given their impact – we must capture how these tensions impact some
broader theory or system of concern.
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Personas are fictional characters that represent archetypal users, and embody their needs
and goals (Cooper et al., 2014). Personas are the product of research with representative end-
users; designing for a single persona means designing for the user community he or she
represents. By facilitating design for one customer voice rather than many, personas have
become a popular user experience (UX) technique for eliciting and validating user
requirements. They are also helpful when designing for security. Should a persona
experience physical or cognitive burden whilst completing a task then his performance
might not be as intended. Steps might be omitted or the task altered to achieve an end more
conducive to the persona’s own goals, irrespective of whether or not the intent is malicious.
Personas can inspire the identification of security tensions, but in practice, they do not.
Design processes prioritising agility provide little time for using personas for anything
besides validating stakeholder value has been achieved. Even if we assume UX and security
engineers collaborate, personas are not always used in the ways envisaged by designers
(Friess, 2012), whilst security engineers might primarily focus on requirements for security
mechanisms. Given their differing concerns and perspectives, problems may not be found
even when these are indicated during the collection or analysis of user research data.
Personas, as user models, can be integrated into security requirements engineering (RE)
practices and tools, but they need to be built and presented differently. This may make it
easier for stakeholders to identify the security implications of user goals being satisfied or
denied. Goal models in languages such as i* (Yu, 1997) and the goal-oriented requirements
language (GRL) (Amyot et al., 2010) provide a foundation for this improved integration; they
represent the intentions and rationale of social and technical actors, their inter-relations and
alternative strategies giving space for variability accommodation, including that of user
types. Approaches such as Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) and socio-
technical systems-ml (Paja et al., 2013) show how goal models can be used in the early stage
of design to find vulnerabilities. However, they are role-focussed whereas people are
expected to align to one or more ways to achieve predefined goals.
To integrate personas into goal-oriented security RE, this paper presents a tool-supported
approach for visualising personas as goal models, and extends previous work presented at the
fourth International Workshop on Security and Privacy RE (Faily et al., 2020a). In doing so, we
provide two examples of how this approach can identify security tensions. User research and
threat modelling can be time-consuming and cognitively intensive activities that might happen
separately or in parallel before, during or after other RE activities. It is, therefore, necessary to
loosely couple these goal models such that other design models can evolve orthogonally with
minimum disruption to existing processes and tools.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we consider related
work in social goal modelling and security, personas and usable and secure RE upon which
our approach is based. In Section 3, we present the processes and tool-support algorithm
that underpins our approach. Using an industrial control systems case study example, we
provide two examples of how this approach can be used to identify security tensions in
Section 4. We discuss the implications of our work and potential limitations in Section 5,
before concluding in Section 6 by summarising the contributions of our work to date and
directions for future work.
2. Related work
2.1 Personas for security
UX professionals have long used personas to bring user requirements to life, and there has
been some work within the RE community on using personas to add contextual variability
to social goal models (Nunes Rodrigues et al., 2018).
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The merits of using personas to elicit security requirements were identified by Faily and
Fléchais (2010), who showed how the use of personas could show the human impact of
security to stakeholders who have never met user communities represented by personas. In
recent years, there has also been additional interest in the RE community on the use of
personas to engage stakeholders when validating requirements (Cleland-Huang, 2013), and
how data used to construct personas can have some security value. For example, Mead et al.
(2017) demonstrated how the text from personas built on assumptions about attackers –
Personae Non-Gratae – could be mined to identify potential threat models and identify gaps
between a designer’s and attacker’s model of a system. However, Mead and her colleagues
focus on the identification of threats to a system rather than vulnerabilities that might arise
from interactions between personas and the system.
2.2 Assuring personas with argumentation models
To use personas in some security context, we need confidence they are valid. Without this
assurance, the legitimacy of any models related to them could be called into question.
Chapman and Milham (2006) question whether obtaining this validity is possible. They
claim applying qualitative approaches to the creation of personas means personas cannot be
validated because the personas cannot be falsified and subsequently disproved. However,
subsequent work in the human computer interaction (HCI) community found that, if
personas are constructed using qualitative data analysis, the results of this analysis can be
framed as argumentation models (Faily and Fléchais, 2011). These models, based on
Toulmin’s model of argumentation (Toulmin, 2003), draw analogies between the
characteristics of a persona and a claim underpinned by multiple propositions as grounds,
warrants that connect these grounds to a claim and rebuttals that state propositions
questioning the basis of a claim. Argumentation models have also made an important
contribution to evaluating the rationale underpinning software design, and providing
confidence that claims made during software design can be justified (Burge et al., 2008).
2.3 Finding vulnerabilities using social goal modelling
Personas are not the only models used for modelling users and their expectations. Social goal
modelling languages such as i* have been proposed by the RE community for specifying human
intentions, and modelling how they contribute to other intentions. They also support the
modelling of dependencies between different actors, where a depender actor depends on
dependee actor for some resource dependum. Such dependencies allude to broader vulnerabilities
because actors themselves become vulnerable when they rely on dependees for dependums.
Analysing the chains of these dependencies can indicate how vulnerable these actors are (Yu,
1995). Moreover, when such models capture a socio-technical system of actors and resources,
they also highlight potential system vulnerabilities resulting from inconsistencies between an
organisation’s policies andworking practices (Massacci and Zannone, 2011).
In previous work examining the use of social goal modelling to support security RE, Liu
et al. (2003) considered how legitimate actors might use their intentions, capabilities and
social relationships to attack the system and how dependency relationships form the basis
of exploitable vulnerabilities. The idea of dependencies as implicit vulnerabilities was
further elaborated by Giorgini et al. (2005), who indicated that dependency relationships can
also capture trust relationships where dependers believe dependees will not misuse a goal,
task or resource (trust of permission) or a trustee believes dependees will achieve a goal,
execute a task or deliver a resource (trust of execution).
Elahi et al. (2010) incorporated vulnerabilities into goal models to link knowledge about
threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to stakeholder goals and security requirements.
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Vulnerabilities are considered as weaknesses in the structure of goals and activities of
intentional agents, which can be propagated via decomposition and dependency links. The
introduction of vulnerabilities was added on the basis that including security and non-security
elements on a single model makes models clearer and facilitates model discussion (Sindre and
Opdahl, 2007). However, whilst this approach supports the specification of vulnerabilities, it
provides little support for eliciting them. This still requires a priori knowledge of potential
system weaknesses or threat models that could take advantage of them. Moreover, Moody et al.
(2009) found that the graphical complexity of i* is several times greater than a human’s standard
limit for distinguishing alternatives. As such, approaches that increase the complexity of the i*
language are likely to hinder rather than improve the understandability of social goal models,
particularly for novices.
2.4 Integrating requirements and information security and computer-aided integration of
requirements and information security
The need to elicit, specify and validate requirements for usable and secure systems has been
independently visualised by the RE, security and HCI communities. As an exemplar for
showing how concepts from these areas complement each other, IRIS (integrating requirements
and information security) framework (Faily, 2018) was devised. IRIS is a process framework for
designing usable and secure software. It incorporates a methodology agnostic meta-model for
usable and secure RE that supports the complementary use of different security, usability and
RE techniques. Personas are integrated into this framework, which uses the knowledge
acquisition in autOmated specification (KAOS) language for modelling system goals (van
Lamsweerde, 2009), obstacles that obstruct the satisfaction of these goals, dependency
associations between roles and relationships between tasks, system goals and the roles
responsible for them. The framework is complemented by CAIRIS (computer-aided integration
of requirements and information security): a software platform for eliciting, specifying,
automatically visualised and validating secure and usable systems that is built on the IRIS
meta-model. By making explicit the links between different security, usability and software
models using IRIS and providing tool-support for automating generating and validating these
models, IRIS and CAIRIS can put one model in context with another. For example, we recently
demonstrated how data flow taint can be identified in data flow diagrams within CAIRIS by
putting these diagrams in context with other software and usability models (Faily et al., 2020b).
Previous work has shown that persona characteristics can be re-framed as goals and soft
goals in social goal models (Faily, 2011). Not only does this make it possible to automatically
generate goal models from argumentation models but also some assurance is also provided for
both the basis of user goals and the broader impact of satisfying these goals on other system
elements. Subsequent work has demonstrated how these concepts can lead to the generation of
elaborate GRL compatible goal models (Faily and Fléchais, 2014). However, a weakness of this
approach is its reliance on additional tool support (jUCMNav), and the limited support of
traceability links between the goal modelling platform and its originating data should the GRL
model evolve; such evolution is likely as different stakeholders make sense of this model.
Subsequent refinement of the jUCMNav model could lead to additional effort by analysts to
ensure the goal model and its foundational CAIRISmodels are visualised.
3. Approach
3.1 Conceptual model
To reframe a persona as a social goal model, our approach relies on aligning concepts from
IRIS with concepts from social goal modelling. A review of the complete conceptual model,
which is described in more detail in Faily (2018), is beyond the scope of this paper. We do,
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however, summarise this model concept alignment in Figure 1, which we provide further
rationale for in the sub-sections below.
3.1.1 Personas and persona characteristics. Our approach has only a minimal impact on
existing IRIS concepts. We assume personas consist of multiple persona characteristics.
These characteristics are attributes of persona behaviour; they can be considered as
arguments for persona behaviour, and are grounded in one or more grounds, warrants and
rebuttal elements. These elements (document references) are factoids that can be drawn from
a variety of primary and secondary data sources (external documents) such as interview
transcripts, observational notes and websites. Further details on these concepts can be
found in Faily (2018).
3.1.2 User goals. User goals represent the intentional desires of actors, where actors are
personas. This definition is in line with the definition used for goals by the social goal
modelling community (Yu, 1995). In our approach, user goals are factoids expressed
intentionally. Yu et al. (2011) state that intentional properties can only be inferred based on
information obtained by indirect means, and that the validity of these attributions can never
be certain. However, as indicated in Section 2.2, the qualitative underpinnings of personas
can be validated, in the same way, that qualitative models, in general, can be validated. So,
although validity can never be certain, our model provides some level of assurance. Based
on the satisfaction levels proposed by Amyot et al. (2010), user goals can be assigned a
qualitative satisfaction level associated with a quantitative score; these values are Satisfied
(100),Weakly Satisfied (50), Weakly Denied (50) and Denied (100).
3.1.3 Hard/soft goals and beliefs. Our approach inherits the idea of hard goals, soft goals
and beliefs from i*.
Hard goals are goals that can be measurably satisfied, whereas soft goals are goals with
less well-defined success criteria that can be satisfied (Simon, 1979).
Beliefs capture facts important to stakeholders (Amyot et al., 2010); we use these to
capture beliefs held by personas. Beliefs are used irregularly in goal models, and whilst it
has been suggested these are used to capture the rationale of designers during modelling
Figure 1.
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rather than stakeholders (Regev and Wegmann, 2005), it has also been accepted that
further exploration on the semantics of beliefs is needed (Yu, 2009). The grounding of
personas and IRIS’ support for KAOS domain properties – that can capture this form of
rationale – means we need not explicitly incorporate rationale meta-data into visual
models. Therefore, beliefs can safely be used to represent stakeholder beliefs without
confusion. User goals are elicited from persona characteristic elements based on the
trust characteristic elicitation process described in Faily and Fléchais (2014), where the
implied goal, soft goal or belief intentions form the basis of user goals associated with
the characteristic and its grounds, warrants and rebuttal elements. These user goals are
expressed as persona intentions.
3.1.4 Aligning system and user goals. As Figure 1 shows, IRIS supports the concept of
system goal, i.e. prescriptive statements of intent that the system should satisfy throughout
the cooperation of its intended roles in a particular environment; this definition is based on
the KAOS definition of goal (van Lamsweerde, 2009). Obstacles obstructing these goals may
be associated with vulnerabilities, thereby connecting a goal view of a system with a risk
view. IRIS also supports dependency modelling of system goals, where a depender role
depends on dependee role for a goal or task dependum.
Until now, IRIS has not incorporated the notion of user goal because, as a
methodologically agnostic meta-model, discretion on how to map user goals and
expectations to system functionality is left to designers. However, in the case of a goal
dependum, we should be able to capture the need for user goals to be satisfied to
satisfy system goals. Consequently, our approach now adds an explicit traceability
link between user goals that personas might have, and KAOS goals that a system
needs to satisfy. This traceability link could be bi-directional, as we do not prescribe
the elicitation of one type of goal before the other. For example, an analyst may capture
system goals to satisfy a persona’s goals, so may wish to indicate the system goals that
address these user goals. Conversely, in a pre-existing system model, an analyst may
wish to examine the implication of system requirements on the value a persona wishes
to achieve. Our approach precludes neither possibility and facilitates subsequent
model validation checks.
3.2 Modelling user goal contributions
To visualise personas as goal models, our approach extends the i* Strategic Rationale model
(Yu, 1995) in twoways.
Firstly, we align persona characteristic elements with contribution links.
Contribution links indicate the desired impact that one system element has on another
(Amyot et al., 2010). As user goals are part of the broader socio-technical system being
modelled, it is reasonable to assume that one user goal can contribute to another. In our
approach, argumentation elements form the basis of means/end contribution links
between user goals, i.e. where one user goal is the means for another user goal’s end.
Links are annotated with two additional pieces of information, namely, whether a link
is a “means” or an “end” with respect to the characteristic’s goal, soft goal or belief, an
optional initial satisfaction level, based on the qualitative values and quantitative
scores specified in Amyot et al. (2010), i.e. Satisfied (100) Weakly Satisfied (50), Weakly
Denied (50) and Denied (100); this is analogous to the setting of strategies in
jUCMNav (Amyot et al., 2010).
Secondly, as tasks can have a security impact (Elahi et al., 2010), completion of a task
contributes to one or more user goals.
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Like other goal modelling languages, contributions have a qualitative value corresponding
to a quantitative score. We base these values on those used by GRL: Make (100),
SomePositive (50), Help (25), Hurts (25), SomeNegative (50) and Break (100). Make and
break contributions lead to the satisfaction or denial of user goals, respectively; similarly,
help and hurt contributions help or hinder the satisfaction of user goals. SomePositive and
SomeNegative values indicate some indeterminate level of positive or negative contribution
that exceeds helping or hindering.
The approach for calculating contributions is similar to Giorgini et al.’s label propagation
algorithm (Giorgini et al., 2003). We implemented a recursive, forward propagation
calculateGoalContribution (Algorithm 1) based on the CalculateContribution algorithm
described in Amyot et al. (2010).
The setting of an initial satisfaction score (Line 2) based on the previously
described satisfaction level is permitted; this can override the calculated goal score
from related tasks and goal contributions. If the initial satisfaction score has not been
overridden and no system goals associated with a user goal have not been obstructed
(Lines 4–6), a contribution score is calculated. To handle goal contribution loops, i.e.
where user goal x is a means to goal y, which is a means to goal x or situations where
the user goal x contributes to several user goals that eventually contribute to user goal
y, a persistent set of visited goals and their contribution scores, evaluatedGoals, is
retained. Propagation occurs if a goal’s name is not in this set (Lines 9–26), otherwise
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the previously retained contribution for that goal is reused (Line 28). The contribution
score is calculated based on the tasks contributing to it (Lines 9–12) and the product of
each contributing goal and the contribution link strength (Lines 13–19). If the score
calculated is greater than 100 or less than 100 then the score is visualised to a value
within this range (Lines 21–25).
3.3 Tool-support
To show how this approach might be implemented in requirements management tools
more generally, we incorporated a new model type and supporting tools into CAIRIS
release 2.3.6.
We tool-supported the additional concepts and algorithms by introducing a user goal
visual model. This is based on the visual semantics of GRL, where a rounded box
represents a hard goal, a polygon with rounded corners represents a soft goal, an ellipse
represents a belief and dashed rectangle models the actor boundary. In this model, actors
are represented by personas. Further drawing from the semantics used by GRL and
jUCMNav, these nodes are coloured from dark green to dark red corresponding with
satisfaction values of Satisfied (100) and Denied (100); nodes with a value of None (0)
are coloured yellow.
User goal models are generated automatically by CAIRIS using the same pipeline
process used to visualise other CAIRIS models. A declarative model of graph edges is
generated by CAIRIS; this is processed and annotated by Graphviz (AT&T, 2020) before
being subsequently rendered as scalable vector graphics. This annotation stage includes
applying Algorithm 1 to user goal nodes to determine its score, and subsequent colour. The
CAIRIS model generation process is described in more detail in Faily (2018). The algorithms
described were incorporated into an implied vulnerability model validation check, which is
applied to all KAOS goal dependency relationships in a CAIRIS model. CAIRIS model
validation checks are implemented internally within the relational database used by a
CAIRIS model as structured query language stored procedures.
As shown in Figure 2, we also extended CAIRIS to generate Excel workbooks for
capturing user goals and contribution links. Such workbooks are useful for analysts
wishing to contribute to user goal modelling via more familiar office automation
tools.
The generated Excel workbook contains UserGoal and UserContribution spreadsheets,
where edited cells for both are coloured green. The UserGoal worksheet is pre-populated
with read-only data on the persona characteristic or document reference name, its
description, the persona it is associated with and an indicator to whether the reference
corresponds to a persona [characteristic] or document reference. When completing the
worksheet, analysts should indicate the intentional elements associated with the persona
characteristics or document references providing their grounds, warrants or rebuttals.
Analysts should also indicate the element type (goal, softgoal or belief), and the initial
satisfaction level using the dropdown lists provided. The source and destination cells in the
ContributionsSheet are pre-populated once user goals have been added in the UserGoal
sheet, so only the means/end and contribution links need to be set.
We further extended CAIRIS to allow the contents of these workbooks to be imported
into a pre-existing CAIRIS model.
4. Case study: security tensions at ACMEwater
We show how our approach might be used with two examples[1] that identify security
tensions associated with ACME Water. ACME Water is an visualised UK water company
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responsible for providing clean and wastewater services to several million people in a
particular UK region. The infrastructure needed to support such a large customer base was
substantial, amounting to over 60 water treatment works, 800 wastewater treatment works,
550 service reservoirs, 27,000 km of water mains, 19,000 km of sewer networks, with over
1,900 pumping stations and 3,200 combined sewer outflows.
The first example in Section 4.1 describes and illustrates how our approach complements
the steps necessary to identify implicit vulnerabilities affecting a security policy. Implicit
vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that may be present when dependees fall short of their
responsibility to deliver dependums (Liu et al., 2003). Where these vulnerabilities are
present, the values held by humans acting as dependers and dependees may be in tension
with trust. Consequently, identifying these tensions may provide insights into the root
causes of system vulnerabilities.
The second example in Section 4.2 shows how our approach can be used to examine
security tensions associated with penetration testing. Penetration testers conduct visualised
“penetration tests” that probe a system’s defences to evaluate the impact of any discovered
weaknesses; they require creativity and ingenuity to find unexpected ways of breaching a
system, with the added constraint that finding and exploiting vulnerabilities should neither
harm the system nor encroach on the dignity of those affected by it. When faced with ethical
dilemmas, penetration testers are expected to adopt different ethical perspectives when
deciding the right course of action (Mouton et al., 2015). However, previous work by some of
the authors (Faily et al., 2015) indicated that penetration testers are subject to certain
decision-making biases; when faced with ethical dilemmas, these biases influence decisions
of ethical import.
4.1 Example 1: implicit vulnerabilities affecting ACME water security policy
4.1.1 Implicit vulnerability identification. The steps are taken to identify implicit
vulnerabilities are concerned with dependencies between systems rather than user goals,
and considers two situations where dependums might not be delivered. Firstly, if a system
goal dependum or its refinements are obstructed and not resolved. Secondly, if the








Algorithm 2 specifies how the presence of such implicit vulnerabilities might be identified
within a typical recursive system goal satisfaction algorithm. The algorithm returns a value
of true if the system goal g is obstructed.
The algorithm navigates the visualising tree-based KAOS goal refinements (Lines 11–27)
to determine if there are obstruct associations between refined goals and obstacles, and these
obstacles have not been resolved, i.e. there are no resolve relationships between obstacles
and goals, which address them. However, this check can be a shortcut should a linked user
goal associated with system goal g be denied, i.e. has a score less than 0 (Lines 3–10). Should
this check not be a shortcut then the isObstacleObstructed algorithm (Line 19) determines
whether a goal is obstructed. This algorithm returns a value of true should one or more of
the following conditions hold, namely, the obstacle or one of its obstacle refinements are not
resolved by a [mitigating] system goal, an obstacle or one of its obstacle refinements are
resolved, but the resolved goal has one or more linked user goals, which are denied. The
isObstacleObstructed algorithm is formally specified in Faily et al. (2020b).
Vulnerabilities within IRIS are defined as system weaknesses (Faily, 2018), but an
implicit vulnerability may not always be a system weakness. It may indicate some
inconsistency between what system roles and humans fulfillingmight want and need or – as
suggested by Pastor et al. (2011) – some level of human fallibility resulting from roles that
participate in too many dependencies as a depender. However, implicit vulnerabilities can
help make sense of different system models and, in doing so, provide a rationale for
vulnerabilities feeding into risk models.
4.1.2 User research and persona creation. Four in-situ interviews were held with six plant
operators, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) engineers and plant operation
managers at two clean water and two wastewater treatment plants. These interviews were
recorded, and the transcripts analysed using grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
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The analysis led to a qualitative model of plant operations security perceptions. Using the
persona case technique (Faily and Fléchais, 2011), we derived, from the model, a single
persona of a water-treatment plant operator, Rick, incorporating 32 persona characteristics
and backed up by 82 argumentation elements (grounds, warrants or rebuttals).
4.1.3 ACME water security policy model. The ACMEWater security policy wasmodelled
as a KAOS goal model where each system goal represented a policy goal. These policy goals
were created by visualise existing documentation about ACME’s existing information
security policy and agreeing the scope of the policy to be modelled with ACME’s
information technology (IT) security manager. Existing policy documentation was analysed
to elicit and specify a KAOS goal model of 82 policy goals, with a single high level goal
(Secure operating environment) and, as shown in Figure 3, 11 refined sub-goals representing
the different policy areas. These goals and other security and usability elements of the
operating environment were specified in a CAIRIS model; these included 2 personas, 11
roles, 21 obstacles, 9 vulnerabilities, 5 tasks and 6 role-goal-role dependencies.
4.1.4 User goal model creation. To generate a user goal model based on Rick, we initially
derived 104 user goals and beliefs from both the persona characteristics and argumentation
elements and 165 contribution links. The first two authors then reviewed the model to de-
duplicate synonymous user goals. For example, a Site protected user goal was associated
with a Copper theft document reference, as the intention implied was that the site needed to
be protected from this threat. However, we identified a Site secured user goal associated with
Physical and login security document reference. As a result, we deleted the former user goal,
and contribution linked its user goals to Site secure. In parallel with the de-duplication of
user goals, we also added additional contribution links between user goals based on our
understanding of the persona and his intentions, where these contribution links cross-cut
persona characteristics. For example, on reviewing the persona characteristics and their
underpinning data, we noted that theThieves ignore impact user goal, which was associated
with the thieves do not care about their impact characteristic, helped foster the belief that
personal safety is a hygiene factor; this belief was associated with the personal safety is an
infosec hygiene factor persona characteristic. Following this analysis, the final model
resulted in 93 user goals and beliefs and 205 contribution links.
Figure 4 shows the goal model generated by CAIRIS for Rick.
4.1.5 ICT awareness implicit vulnerabilities. From Figure 5, we identified a link between
the InfoSec communications perceived user goal (annotated as 2) and the inforrmation and
communications technology (ICT) awareness system goal, which is a refinement of the high-
level Secure Site system goal.
The ICT awareness system goal indicates ICT partners should know how to maintain
equipment hosted in the secure areas and, as Figure 5 (inset) shows, this system goal is
already obstructed due to exposed and surplus equipment, which should not be present.
Unfortunately, as Figure 5 also indicates, the related user goal is also denied. The negative
impact affects not only the perception of site security but also the perception the site is run
efficiently; this corroborates the obstacles found to be present in the system goal model. To
reinforce this, the belief Thieves steal anything (annotated as 1) was set to satisfied, which
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This highlighted the need for a new dependency where an IT security manager depends on
an ICT partner to achieve the ICT awareness goal.
The limited security awareness means operators fail to see the connection between
misunderstanding visualised, and wifi insecurity and site security, due to their belief that an
air gap exists between wireless networks and industrial control systems. Access controls on
pump actions further support the belief that unknown applications are unauthorised. To
explore this further, we associated the Pump action restricted user goal with the Access
Control system goal, and added a dependency to indicate that plant operators depend on
information security managers for this goal. CAIRIS subsequently flagged a model
validation warning because a refined goalVendor passwords was obstructed, due to
evidence that vendors were using easily guessed default passwords for certain critical
components.
4.1.6 Validating vulnerabilities with implicit vulnerabilities. As indicated in Figure 1,
obstacles can be associated with vulnerabilities to capture the rationale for including
vulnerabilities in subsequent risk analysis activities. In the ACME water model, an Exposed
ICT Cabinets obstacle was already associated with an Exposed cabinet vulnerability, but –
given how divisive resolving obstacles might be because of the architectural implications of
their resolution –wewanted to see if the user goal model of Rick provided a human rationale
for the obstacle’s presence.
Information security managers depend on plant operators for a related Industrialised
secure cabinet system goal to ensure control systems are kept in secure cabinets. On
reviewing the user goal model and the tasks in the ACMEwater model, we noted that no one
was explicitly required to check these cabinets; instead, ACME water trusted Rick to do this
whilst discharging other duties.
As Figure 6 shows, as part of a pre-existing Broken Instrument alarm task (annotated as
3), we introduced help contribution links to Complex failure callout and SCADA alarm
responded because Rick completes the task to satisfy these user goals. The task entails Rick
being away from the safety of the control room to respond to equipment alarms from these
cabinets. Should these alarms fire out of hours, the model shows that Rick might feel uneasy,
particularly if he thinks the alarm indicates intruders are stealing equipment. The potential
for Rick to skip the steps necessary to check these cabinets was corroborated in the user goal
model due to the SCADA alarm responded being very weakly satisfied.
4.2 Security tensions resulting from penetration testing practices
4.2.1 User research and persona creation. We visualised a penetration tester persona to
examine the implications of the interaction between testers and their tools and techniques,
typify the situations where such decisions might be made, and identify penetration tester
goals that positively or negatively impact these situations.
We analysed transcripts collected during the previous work by the authors (Faily et al.,
2015) from eight semi-structured interviews with professional penetration testers; each
interview lasted approximately 45min. Using grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008),
we analysed the transcripts and develop a qualitative model of ethical hazards and
safeguards. Based on this model, we elicited the four ethical hazards specified in Table 1.
These are situations likely to increase the probability of unethical behaviour because of the
means, motive and opportunity to engage in such behaviour (Pendse, 2011). These ethical
hazards can be mitigated by the safeguards summarised in Table 2.
Using the persona case process (Faily and Fléchais, 2011) and CAIRIS, a persona was
created based on an experienced penetration tester, Ben, incorporating 18 persona
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to the interviewees for comments and, based on the feedback, subsequent axial and selective
coding identified several key concepts. From this, we generated a user goal model based on
Ben, we initially derived 84 user goals from both the persona characteristics and
argumentation elements and 84 contribution links. The first two authors subsequently
reviewed the model to remove duplicate user goals and, drawing on insights of the ethical
hazards and safeguards, added additional contributions. This resulted in an additional 11
contribution links, i.e. a final model of 84 user goals and 95 contribution links.
To simulate the effect of realising each ethical hazard, we identified the user goals related
to each ethical hazard and set each user goal with an appropriate level of initial satisfaction
(satisfied or denied) as indicated in Table 3. Figure 7 shows the user goal model associated
with Ben when the satisfaction level for these goals are set.
4.2.2 Validating ethical hazards and safeguards. To confirm the presence of the ethical
hazards and safeguards, we surveyed professional penetration testers to compare whether their
understanding of ethical hazards and safeguards correspondedwith those in ourmodel.
The participants recruited worked at CREST (Council of Registered Ethical Security
Testers) member companies (CREST, 2021) and possessed the level of experience as those
participants originally interviewed, i.e. underpinning the Ben persona. As the participants
held a current CREST accreditation, they were expected to have a working knowledge of the
CREST code of conduct (CREST, 2014).
The sensitivity of this topic meant that the responses received might not accurately
reflect the values held by participants. For this reason, we decided to use Ben to indirectly
capture participant opinions about ethical issues, in such a way that participants felt their
own ethical norms and values were not being probed. To do this, we used the premortem
technique to elicit responses from participants to a situation where ethical hazards were
present. Premortems are a participative design technique where participants assume that a
system has failed, and are asked to provide plausible reasons are given for why (Klein,
2007); previous work has shown that this technique can also be effective for providing
reasons for the security exploitation of systems too (Faily et al., 2012).
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Legal ambiguity The uncertainty associated with addressing unusual forms of illegality when
encountered or dilemmas between following the agreed rules of engagement or informing
law enforcement agencies
Human targets Any testing activities with the potential to jeopardise the career or well-being of test subjects
Red team vs blue
team
Tensions that arise between testers (red teams) and client IT teams responsible for
interacting with them (blue teams)
Client indifference Occurrences where clients are reluctant to make changes prescribed by penetration











Floods caused by Red Team
ACME Water are seeking damages from RedTeam limited liability partnership (a
CREST member company) for locking a water treatment plant operator (Rick) out
of their IT network. ACME considers this was the root cause of flooding that
caused significant disruption in the Dorset region. As an expert witness, you have
been asked to uncover evidence of unprofessional behaviour by a RedTeam
engineer (Ben).
It is 1530 on a rainy Tuesday afternoon.
Ben and Alex are security engineers for RedTeam. Both are working as part of a
larger project conducting a red team test on ACME Water; they are evaluating
ACME’s security posture to ensure their security policies on the use of IT are being
followed. For this engagement, Alex is shadowing Ben. For the past week, Ben and
Alex have been working out of the RedTeam office in Bournemouth but, for today
only, both are working from hot desks in ACME’s head office in Dorchester.
Alex is running RedTeam’s ICS network auditing tool (RETINAT) to identify
potential vulnerabilities on ACME’s corporate IT network. For the past week, Alex
has been customising RETINAT to include protocols and services used by ACME,
as well as ACME phone number ranges for the tool’s wardriving functionality.
RETINAT was written and maintained by RedTeam staff, but the tool interfaces
with various open source tools. Alex’s testing with RETINAT appeared to proceed
smoothly and, after writing up notes on his findings, both Ben and Alex left shortly
after 5 p.m.
At 1950, Rick arrived at Moorside Water Treatment Works to start his shift. What
started as light rain in the morning had now developed into a torrential downpour.
Rick was worried about the potential for flooding caused by the rain, so decided to
check the water level at various points across the water distribution network using
the automated job system (AJS) tool. Unfortunately, after several attempts, Rick
discovered that he was unable to login into Windows to access AJS. Without access
to AJS, not only would Rick be unable to check the water level, but he would also be
unable to control the defences available to him for reducing the water flow. Rick
attempted to call the ACME IT help-desk, but was greeted with an automated reply
because help is only available between 0900–1700 on weekdays.
Because he was on his own for the rest of the night, Rick attempted to call Barry –
an on-call instrument technician – in the hope that he could use his credentials to
access AJS. After several hours, Rick was finally able to reach Barry at 2200. Barry
had been working on other jobs in an area lacking mobile phone coverage. Barry
provided Rick with his own Window login details over the phone, which finally
allowed him to access AJS to check and control the water level. Rick discovered
that the water level was so high that several downstream villages and the main rail
line to London was now flooded. The flooding subsequently disrupted transport
links to the region for nearly 24 h, causing over £1m of property damage.
A review of the incident by ACME concluded that Rick was unable to login
because his Windows account was locked due to an excessive number of login
attempts; these login attempts appear to have been made by RETINAT. The
review concluded that, had the upstream water levels been reduced by 2030, much
of the downstream flooding could have been avoided. The review also noted the
additional factors:
ICS
 Alex was a recent graduate. He had joined RedTeam a few months before the engagement,
and started work on the ACME project the previous week.
 ACME were aware that vulnerability evaluation tests would be taking place during the week,
and these tests would entail the enumeration of discovered network applications during
working hours.
 Ben examined the test results before going home on Tuesday. He noted nothing unusual that
would warrant client contact.
 When George – ACME’s IT manager – spoke to Ben about the account lockout on Wednesday
morning, Ben stated that RedTeam did not do anything that was not within their pre-agreed
scope of activities.
 When the scope of activities was initially agreed, ACME indicated that several legacy
applications associated with water flood level monitoring was prone to unpredictable
behaviour. Ben confirmed that these applications would not be considered within the test’s
scope.
 Ben accepted that his relationship with George was tenuous. Several times during the past
week, George spoke to Ben about problems accessing network services, which, it was claimed,
was attributed to RedTeam’s testing. Ben was used to receiving complaints from George, and
did not think his conversation on Wednesday morning was out of the ordinary.
This scenario intentionally embodied the realisation of each ethical hazard via the
appropriate satisfaction or denial of related user goals in Table 3. For example, the first
factor from the review embodies denial of the Ethical knowledge shared user goal because
Alex’s recent arrival provided little opportunity for him to be onboarded with the expected
ethical norms.
Participants were asked to provide open-ended responses with reasons why Ben might
have behaved unethically (ethical hazards), together with things that the company could do
to address the problems found (safeguards).
Five participants responded via email with 18 candidate ethical hazards and 21
candidate safeguards. Each candidate’s ethical hazard was coded based on related user
goals and user goals directly harmed as a result. Similarly, each candidate safeguard was
categorised based on related user goals and user goals directly safeguarded. These
responses and solutions are detailed in Tables 4 and 5.
The results indicated that 14 of the 18 candidate ethical hazards corresponded with at
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the unwarranted trust placed in the tools used by the junior tester; the other was attributed
to Ben not properly supervising the junior tester.
Whilst all candidate safeguards corresponded to at least one safeguard from the model, it
is less clear how effective the proposed responses are at addressing the ethical hazards. For
example, Response 2 corresponds with the satisfaction of the Professional test run, which
implies that the Professional standards maintained user goal would also be satisfied. This
corresponds with Risk Articulation and Responsibility to Practice safeguards but, as Figure 8
indicates, the latter goal remains denied due to the satisfaction level of user goals related to
the ethical hazards. As such, whilst the safeguard is valid, it is unlikely to be effective
without some combination of other safeguards being present too.
5. Discussion and limitations
The examples illustrate how our approach complements pre-existing methods for eliciting
and exploring value tensions. For example, Friedman and Hendry (2019) propose the idea of
value personas that encapsulate key values and different value tensions both within and
between other personas. If such values inform the elicitation of subsequently analysed data,
social goal models can then be used to explore the strengthening and weakening of different
tensions related to areas such as security, privacy and trust. Moreover, the application of
value scenarios (ibid) is analogous to our use of premortems in Example 2.
Our approach also illustrates the ease that social goal models could, potentially, be
validated. The goal-oriented RE community has often use goal models to validate designs
and systems, e.g. evaluate conflicting access to resources of deadline because of mutual
reliance (Ali et al., 2013), but work on validating the goal models themselves has relied on the
arguments underpinning the model elements (Jureta et al., 2008) and the mapping of goal
models to natural language, which is then validated (Hassine and Amyot, 2016). Such
validation approaches entail additional effort in addition to constructing the model, e.g. in
specifying further relations and constructs and also in interacting with the tools to provide
further input and confirmation of detected relationships and conflicts. Deriving goal models
from persona cases means some confidence in the empirical basis can be gleaned both before
goal models are created, and independent of the team constructing the goal model. The
examples also illustrate the different ways that integrated tool-support make it possible to
validate the goal model for soundness, and the impact that other models could have on goal
models.
Whilst important for validating requirements, traceability is a weakness of languages
such as i* due to a lack of guidelines for working with complementary models (Pastor et al.,
2011). Our approach addresses this traceability problem by drawing user goal relationships
from the qualitative data analysis underpinning personas. However, a limitation of our
approach is the restricted expressiveness of the generated user goal models, particularly the
lack of support for strategic dependencies between user goals. Supporting dependencies






Ethical hazard User goals (satisfied/denied)
Legal ambiguity Sensitised to legal issues (denied), ethical knowledge shared (denied)
Human targets Methodology explained (denied)
Red vs blue teams Clients appraised of test details (denied), expected behaviour confirmed (denied), IT
team communications respectful (denied)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































traceability would necessitate changes to how the qualitative data grounding personas is
elicited and analysed to ensure both personas and their collaborative aspects are
encapsulated. Approaches for creating such personas already exist (Matthews et al., 2011)
and could provide a grounding for subsequent modelling of user goal dependencies.
Another limitation of our work is that our case study considers only individual personas.
Emergent properties could exist when multiple personas collaborate and modelling and
reasoning would needs to account for this emergence, e.g. through simulation and role-
playing techniques at the design stages and also through feedback loops during the
operation of systems. However, our initial results developing and evaluating the changes to
CAIRIS indicate that user goal models place little additional performance burden to model
validation checks. Because CAIRIS can incrementally import models that overlay existing
models, it is possible to incrementally add personas to a baseline system to explore the
impact of different personas interacting with each other. Based on the process and
performance of the tool support, we believe our approach scales to multiple personas too, but
a more thorough performance evaluation will be the subject of future work.
6. Conclusion
This paper presented an approach for reframing personas as social goal models and, in
doing so, using both the reframed and related models to find security tensions. As a result,
we have made two contributions. Firstly, we demonstrated how the user research used to
construct personas can be leveraged to partially automate the construction of social goal
models. Such user goals could be elicited either whilst constructing personas or afterwards –
in which case the process of constructing the user goal models helps further validate the
personas and the data upon which they are based. Secondly, we illustrated how minimal
contributions to existing tool-support and the use of complementary design techniques
facilitates automation for both the identification of implicit vulnerabilities from user goal
models, and the validation of existing system goal obstructions based on user goals and
user goal contributions. Our intention is not to replace traditional RE approaches to
system and social goal modelling, but to show how applying them in a different way can
identify and confirm potential security problems that might have otherwise remained
hidden.
Future work will further examine persona characteristics and goal and task attributes to
evaluate fitness between persona and actors in goal models. For example, some goals might
require long-term attention span whilst others require different social skills. The user model
associated with these attributes will be then used to simulate how different personas interact
and whether this leads to insecurity. We will also investigate collaborative information
gathering techniques to capture goal models and their personas, e.g. through an interactive
Figure 8.





algorithm driven by representative users providing satisfaction and denial weights and
propagation options.
Note
1. CAIRIS models for both examples are available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4584619
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